Fleeing East from Indian Country: \u3ci\u3eState v. Eriksen\u3c/i\u3e and Tribal Inherent Sovereign Authority to Continue Cross-Jurisdictional Fresh Pursuit by Naud, Kevin, Jr.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 87 Number 4 
12-1-2012 
Fleeing East from Indian Country: State v. Eriksen and Tribal 
Inherent Sovereign Authority to Continue Cross-Jurisdictional 
Fresh Pursuit 
Kevin Naud Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin Naud Jr., Comment, Fleeing East from Indian Country: State v. Eriksen and Tribal Inherent Sovereign 
Authority to Continue Cross-Jurisdictional Fresh Pursuit, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 1251 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol87/iss4/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
11 - Naud Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012 7:40 PM 
 
1251 
FLEEING EAST FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: STATE V. 
ERIKSEN AND TRIBAL INHERENT SOVEREIGN 
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL 
FRESH PURSUIT 
Kevin Naud, Jr. 
Abstract: In State v. Eriksen, the Washington State Supreme Court held that Indian tribes 
do not possess the inherent sovereign authority to continue cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit 
and detain a non-Indian who violated the law on reservation land. This Comment argues the 
Eriksen Court’s reliance on RCW 10.92.020 is misplaced. RCW 10.92.020 is irrelevant to a 
consideration of sovereign authority. States do not have the authority to unilaterally define 
tribal power. A tribe retains sovereign powers not taken by Congress, given away in a treaty, 
or removed by implication of its dependent status. The Eriksen Court also misinterpreted the 
state statute as a limit on tribal authority to enforce laws and incorrectly dismissed the 
validity of cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of a non-felon. Eriksen guts the ability of tribes 
to enforce their sovereign right to uphold the law and safety on the reservation. To reinforce 
tribal power, Congress should enact legislation similar to the “Duro Fix,” a statutory 




On September 1, 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court decided 
State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III).1 Writing for the majority, Justice Fairhurst 
held that a tribal police officer lacked the inherent sovereign authority2 
to stop and detain a non-Indian defendant outside the tribe’s territorial 
                                                     
1. 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011). 
2. Inherent sovereign authority is defined as “those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by 
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.” United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citation omitted), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) 
(2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.02[1], at 222–23 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., 2012) [hereinafter 
COHEN]. Cohen’s Handbook provides the legal basis for inherent authority: (1) consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, prior to European contact, a tribe possessed the powers of any sovereign 
state; (2) consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the tribe’s presence within the United States 
“subjects the tribe to federal legislative power and precludes the exercise of external powers of 
sovereignty of the tribe . . . but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe;” and, as 
a result, (3) tribes retain internal sovereignty for all powers not diminished by treaties or by express 
legislation of Congress. Id. Since Cohen first published his handbook in 1941, the Supreme Court 
added the third way a sovereign power is removed from a tribe: as a necessary implication of its 
dependent status. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. Inherent powers are not delegated to tribes by 
Congress, but are powers that have never been extinguished. COHEN, supra, § 4.01[1][a], at 207. 
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jurisdiction, even though pursuit began within the reservation.3 Eriksen 
III mandates that tribal officers who are not certified to enforce 
Washington law under RCW 10.92.020 release non-Indian law violators 
who have fled the reservation with officers in fresh pursuit.4 In effect, 
Eriksen III permits non-Indians to act with impunity on tribal land as 
long as they can successfully evade tribal officers.5 
The Eriksen III holding will harm tribal interests. Tribes allow a large 
number of non-Indian visitors to enter their reservations on a daily basis 
to further economic development. Twenty-two of Washington’s twenty-
nine federally-recognized tribes operate casinos.6 There are also other 
retail establishments located within reservations that draw visitors. The 
level of non-Indian traffic is extraordinary. The Tulalip reservation alone 
receives 42,000 guests on a weekday and over 60,000 on a weekend 
day.7 In the face of this level of ingress, tribes without state approval to 
enforce state law are now limited in their ability to ensure health and 
safety on the reservation. 
This unpalatable result should not stand because Eriksen III flies in 
the face of established law. Part I of this Comment provides an overview 
of the federal government’s “plenary and exclusive” authority to define 
                                                     
3. 172 Wash. 2d at 515, 259 P.3d at 1084. 
4. Id. at 514–15, 259 P.3d at 1083–84.  
5. Id. at 520–21, 259 P.3d at 1086 (Owens, J., dissenting). 
6. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON STATE TRIBAL DIRECTORY 1–3 (Nov. 
2011), available at http://www.goia.wa.gov/Tribal-Directory/TribalDirectory.pdf; WASH. STATE 
GAMBLING COMM’N TRIBAL & TECHNICAL GAMBLING DIV., TRIBAL CASINOS IN WASHINGTON 
STATE (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.wsgc.wa.gov/docs/tribal/tribal_casinos.pdf. There are 
twenty-eight tribal casinos. Tribe (Name of Casino(s)): Colville (Coulee Dam Casino; Mill Bay 
Casino; Okanogan Bingo-Casino); Chehalis (Lucky Eagle Casino); Jamestown S’Klallam (7 Cedars 
Casino); Kalispel (Northern Quest Casino); Lummi Nation (Silver Reef Casino); Muckleshoot 
(Muckleshoot Casino; Muckleshoot Casino II); Nisqually (Red Wind Casino); Nooksack (Nooksack 
River Casino); Port Gamble (The Point Casino); Puyallup (Emerald Queen Casino at I-5; Emerald 
Queen Casino at Fife); Quinault (Quinault Beach Resort); Skokomish (Lucky Dog Casino); 
Shoalwater Bay (Shoalwater Bay Casino); Snoqualmie (Casino Snoqualmie); Spokane (Chewelah 
Casino; Two Rivers Casino); Squaxin Island (Little Creek Casino); Stilliguamish (Angel of the 
Winds Casino); Suquamish (Clearwater Casino); Swinomish (Northern Lights Casino); Tulalip 
(Tulalip Resort Casino; Quil Ceda Creek Casino); Upper Skagit (Skagit Valley Casino Resort); and 
Yakama Nation (Legends Casino). Id. 
7. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, 38th Legislative District, in Olympia, Wash. (Feb. 14, 2012) 
(on file with University of Washington Law Review). However, not all reservations receive that 
volume of visitation. For example, the Cowlitz Indian Tribe estimates it will see between 16,000 
and 19,000 vehicle trips each day to its proposed casino near La Center, WA. Thacher Schmid, In 
$1 Million Document, Cowlitz Tribe Defends Casino’s Potential Environmental Impact, THE DAILY 
NEWS (Longview, Wash.) (June 29, 2008), http://tdn.com/business/local/in-million-document-
cowlitz-tribe-defends-casino-s-potential-environmental/article_ce80ab50-6681-5cd2-af07-
48cc00323d86.html. 
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inherent sovereign authority. Part II outlines the legal analysis the 
Washington State Supreme Court used in recognizing tribal power to 
stop and detain non-Indians who violate the law on the reservation in 
State v. Schmuck.8 Part III demonstrates that Washington statutes have 
removed jurisdictional barriers from officers pursuing law violators. The 
final background section, Part IV, lays out Eriksen III’s procedural 
history and legal arguments. This Comment argues in Part V that the 
Eriksen III decision is a misunderstanding of the analysis for inherent 
sovereign authority, a misapplication of the canons of construction for 
tribal treaties and statutes, a misinterpretation of the statute authorizing 
certification of tribal officers to enforce state law, a misappropriation of 
precedents and statutes regarding barriers to fresh pursuit, and a 
misalignment with public policy. To limit the precedential effect of 
Eriksen III, this Comment suggests in Part VI that Congress should use 
its exclusive power to define inherent sovereign authority and statutorily 
recognize the right of tribal officers to protect safety on their reservation 
through cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of non-Indians who break the 
law on tribal land. 
 
I.  CONGRESS HAS “EXCLUSIVE AND PLENARY 
AUTHORITY” TO DEFINE A TRIBE’S INHERENT 
SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND DELEGATE JURISDICTION 
OVER TRIBAL RESERVATIONS 
Congress has the sole discretion to define tribal authority and to 
delegate jurisdiction within Indian Country.9 Congress’s supremacy in 
                                                     
8. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993). 
9. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) (“Congress, with this Court’s approval, 
has interpreted the Constitution’s ‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation that 
both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restriction on tribal sovereign authority.”); Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (“The whole intercourse between the United State and 
[the Cherokee] nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United 
States.”), abrogation recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); State v. Comenout, 173 
Wash. 2d. 235, 238, 267 P.3d 355, 357 (2011) (“‘[S]tates . . . lack . . . criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians within Indian country, absent federal legislation specifying to the contrary.’ Significantly, 
Congress enacted a law[,] . . . Public Law 280, which authorized Washington among a few other 
states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country by statute without the consent of the tribe.”) 
(quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 604[1], at 537 (Nell Jessup Newton et 
al., eds., 2005)). See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (declaring that 
Congress has the “plenary” right to abrogate Indian Treaties), abrogated by Delaware Tribal 
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); and United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 
(1905) (stating that the equal footing doctrine does not supersede the federal government’s 
recognition of a tribe’s right to fish at usual and accustomed locations).  
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Indian affairs is founded in the Indian Commerce Clause10 and the 
Treaty Clause11 of the Constitution.12 On this basis, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that Congress’s power is “plenary 
and exclusive” in Indian matters.13 The Court has also stated that 
Congress’s termination of the practice of entering treaties with tribes14 
does not diminish its legislative authority.15 This conclusion rests in part 
upon the historical view that Indian relations are not domestic issues, but 
fall under the military and foreign policy powers “necessarily inherent in 
any Federal Government.”16 Therefore, defining a tribe’s inherent 
sovereign authority is a federal question, not a state issue.17 In United 
States v. Wheeler,18 the Court reiterated that a state’s interests are not a 
factor in determining the extent of tribal inherent sovereign authority: 
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and 
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, 
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian 
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn 
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status.19 
In this vein, the Court once held that “the laws of [a State] can have 
no force” within a reservation.20 While this bar on state power is no 
                                                     
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
12. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.  
13. Id. (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian 
tribes, powers that we have consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”) (citations omitted); 
see also Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993) (“Congress has plenary authority to alter 
these jurisdictional guideposts . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
14. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (“No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States 
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with 
any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”). 
15. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975)). 
16. Id.  
17. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (stating that “state 
authority over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is pre-empted even though Congress has 
offered no explicit statement on the subject”); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980). 
18. 435 U.S. 313 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
19. Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). 
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogation recognized in Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
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longer binding, a state’s interests still cannot dominate a tribe’s interest 
in maintaining sovereignty over its members and its territory, or usurp 
the power of Congress to define tribal authority.21 
As part of its purview, Congress can delegate its authority to regulate 
a tribe.22 For instance, Congress has ceded control over criminal and 
civil jurisdiction in Indian Country to a few states.23 In 1953, Congress 
mandated that six states assume jurisdiction over Indian Country24 under 
Public Law 280.25 Congress also authorized any other state to assume 
the same jurisdiction.26 With the law, Congress hoped to both combat 
perceived lawlessness on reservations and diminish tribal dependence on 
federal resources.27 Initially, Public Law 280 did not require states to 
seek permission from tribes before assuming jurisdiction.28 Congress 
amended Public Law 280 in 1968 so that any subsequent assertion of 
jurisdiction over Indian Country required assent from the relevant tribes, 
but Congress did not require states to retroactively seek permission from 
tribes already under state authority.29 However, Congress did expressly 
authorize retrocession of jurisdiction back to the federal government.30 
In total, state jurisdiction over Indian affairs within Indian Country 
requires Congress’s permission.31 
                                                     
21. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 141–42, 151. 
22. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (The Court rejected an 
unconstitutional delegation of powers argument because “[i]t is necessary only to state that the 
independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect Congress’s decision to vest in tribal 
councils this portion of its own authority ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes’”) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006). 
24. Indian Country is defined as “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . all 
dependent Indian communities . . . [and] all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not 
been extinguished.” Id. § 1151. 
25. Id. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). The six states were California, Wisconsin, Alaska, 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Nebraska. Id. 
26. 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006). 
27. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in 
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1418 (1997) (arguing that Public Law 280, 
although intended to address perceived lawlessness on reservations, actually compounded the 
problem by creating jurisdictional gaps in which no authority either could, or was willing to, enforce 
the law). 
28. Id. at 1406–07. 
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1323.  
30. Id. 
31. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 365 (2001) (“The States’ inherent jurisdiction on reservations 
can of course be stripped by Congress . . . .”) (citing Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242–43 
(1896)); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71 
(1979) (“As a practical matter, this has meant that criminal offenses by or against Indians have been 
subject only to federal or tribal laws, except where Congress in the exercise of its plenary and 
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Prior to the amendment, in 1963, Washington assumed jurisdiction 
over Indian Country within the state.32 Washington still holds this 
jurisdictional power but affords tribes the option to request 
retrocession.33 
II.  THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS FOUND 
THAT NEITHER CONGRESS NOR THE TREATY OF POINT 
ELLIOTT HAS EXPRESSLY DIVESTED TRIBES OF THE 
POWER TO DETAIN NON-INDIANS 
As stated in Wheeler, tribes retain “those aspects of sovereignty not 
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status.”34 In 1993, the Washington State Supreme Court 
decided State v. Schmuck.35 In that case, the question before the Court 
was whether a tribal officer36 had the inherent authority to stop and 
detain a non-Indian driving on a public road.37 To answer this question, 
the Court undertook the analysis the U.S. Supreme Court mandated in 
                                                     
exclusive power over Indian affairs has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.”) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Comenout, 173 Wash. 2d 235, 238, 267 P.3d 
355, 357 (2011) (“[S]tates . . . lack . . . criminal jurisdiction over Indians within Indian country, 
absent federal legislation specifying to the contrary. Significantly, Congress enacted a 
law[,] . . . Public Law 280, which authorized Washington among a few other states to assume 
jurisdiction over Indian country by statute without the consent of the tribe.”) (quoting COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 604[1], at 537 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., 2005)). 
States have jurisdiction over non-Indian/non-Indian crime throughout the territorial bounds of the 
state. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).  
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010) (“The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds 
itself to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, 
country, and lands within this state in accordance with the consent of the United State given by 
[Public Law 280], but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to Indians when on their tribal 
lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United States 
or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States . . . except for the 
following: (1) Compulsory school attendance; (2) Public assistance; (3) Domestic relations; (4) 
Mental illness; (5) Juvenile delinquency; (6) Adoption proceedings; (7) Dependent children; and (8) 
Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads and highways . . . .”).  
33. ESHB 2233, ch. 48 § 1, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified as WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)). Among other steps, the statute requires the governor to approve the 
retrocession. Id.  
34. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citation omitted), superseded by statute, 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see supra 
note 2.  
35. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993). 
36. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of Washington’s recognition of tribal officers in WASH. 
REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010). 
37. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 379, 850 P.2d at 1335. 
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Wheeler.38 
A.  The Federal Government Permits Tribes to Exercise Jurisdiction 
over Non-Members and Non-Indians Under Certain Circumstances 
In theory, the colonial process and westward expansion deprived 
tribes of their external sovereignty but left internal sovereignty intact.39 
Their internal authority is an aspect of sovereignty that has never been 
extinguished.40 For instance, tribes have the inherent right to govern 
themselves and their territory.41 However, due to the diminishment of 
their external sovereignty, tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians and only possess civil jurisdiction where there is a sufficient 
nexus between the action and the tribe’s internal interests.42 
Notwithstanding the power to create and enforce an internal code,43 
tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.44 The U.S. 
Supreme Court expounded on this principle in three cases: Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe,45 Wheeler,46 and Duro v. Reina.47 In Oliphant, 
the Court concluded there was no evidence indicating federal 
recognition of tribal jurisdiction over non-members in either judicial 
                                                     
38. Id. at 380, 850 P.2d at 1335–36; see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
39. See COHEN supra note 2, § 4.02[1], at 222–23. 
40. See id., §4.01[1][a], at 207. 
41. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“[T]o allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here 
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would 
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an 
Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in 
this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”) 
(citations omitted). 
42. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1990) (holding that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian 
Community could not prosecute a non-member Indian who shot and killed a member on the Salt 
River Indian Reservation), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in 
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981) 
(stating that a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority does not sustain its attempts to regulate non-
Indian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation). 
43. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). 
45. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that tribes do not have the sovereign authority to prosecute 
non-Indians), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 
193. 
46. 435 U.S. 313 (holding that because the ability of a tribe to prosecute tribal members was 
inherent, and not a delegated power, subsequent federal prosecution was not double jeopardy). 
47. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
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precedents or legislative history.48 As the Court made explicit in 
Wheeler, a tribe’s diminished status meant it retained only jurisdiction 
over tribal members, unless Congress expressly redefined the limits of 
tribal jurisdiction.49 The Court again affirmed that tribes lack criminal 
jurisdiction over non-members in Duro.50 Congress superseded Duro by 
amending the Indian Civil Rights Act51 to grant tribes criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians (known as the “Duro Fix”).52 However, the 
amendment failed to grant criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.53 
While tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, they 
do have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in rare instances known as 
the Montana exceptions.54 In Montana v. United States,55 the United 
States filed suit to quiet title over a riverbed within the Crow Indian 
Reservation and to establish both the Crow Tribe of Montana and the 
federal government as the only authorities over game within the 
reservation.56 The Crow Tribe sought to prevent non-members from 
fishing and hunting within the reservation based on both the tribe’s 
inherent sovereign authority to regulate actions on tribal land and the 
provisions of the treaties that created the reservation.57 However, 
Montana refused to acquiesce to the tribe’s desire to regulate non-
member behavior because title over the riverbed in question was 
disputed and numerous non-members owned land within the 
reservation.58 The Supreme Court held that the tribe’s inherent 
sovereignty did not authorize it to regulate non-Indian hunting and 
fishing on land within the reservation held in fee by non-Indians.59 The 
                                                     
48. 435 U.S. at 203–11. 
49. 435 U.S. at 322–23. 
50. 495 U.S. at 677. However, both Oliphant and Duro indicate tribes may and should detain law 
violators and transfer them to the proper authorities. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208; Duro, 495 U.S. at 
696–97. 
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). 
52. Id. § 1301(2) (“‘[P]owers of self-government’ means and includes all governmental powers 
possessed by an Indian tribe . . . and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized 
and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”). 
53. Id. §§ 1301–1303.  
54. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
55. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
56. Id. at 544. 
57. Id.  
58. Id. 
59. Id. “[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent 
power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to 
prescribe rules of inheritance for members. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent 
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Court recognized two exceptions to this general denial of tribal civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.60 The tribe can: (1) regulate the activities 
of non-members who “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements,” and (2) “retain inherent power to exercise civil authority 
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”61 
After Montana, courts have cautioned against applying the exceptions 
too broadly.62 For example, the Ninth Circuit, in County of Lewis v. 
Allen,63 stated that a broad application of the second exception would 
lead to absolute jurisdiction by tribes.64 In the court’s opinion, any 
activity on a reservation is conceivably linked to the vitality of a tribe’s 
political, economic, health, or welfare interests.65 Echoing this concern, 
the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the “second exception . . . is only 
triggered by nonmember conduct that threatens the Indian tribe; it does 
not broadly permit the exercise of civil authority wherever it might be 
considered ‘necessary’ to self-government.”66 
The Supreme Court narrowed the application of the exceptions in 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors67 and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation.68 The Court stressed that a balance must 
be upheld between protecting tribal self-government and unduly 
                                                     
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.” Id. at 564 
(citations omitted). 
60. Id. at 565–66. 
61. Id. (citations omitted). 
62. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 657 n.12 (2001); Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (stating that the Montana exceptions did not apply because 
both parties in the civil suit were non-members and opening tribal courts for use by the plaintiff in 
this case is not required to protect tribal self-government); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (holding that the exceptions did not 
apply to instances of zoning fee lands owned by non-members in “open” areas, but did in areas 
closed to the general public. Opening the land to the public diminished the interest of the tribe); 
Cnty. of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a tribal requirement that 
county law enforcement officers be subjected to tribal court jurisdiction was not a sufficient 
component of tribal self-government to allow the interference of a state’s decision to require 
adjudication in state courts). 
63. 163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998). 
64. Id. at 515. 
65. Id. 
66. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 657 n.12 (citation omitted).  
67. 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); see supra note 62. 
68. 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989); see supra note 62. 
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interfering with a state’s interests.69 Specifically, the second exception 
only applies when tribal jurisdiction is required to ensure the tribe’s right 
to govern itself.70 A lower court interpreted the Supreme Court as having 
indicated that a threat to tribal interest need not necessarily come from 
within the reservation.71 However, the Court has stated that the threat 
must constitute an attack on the continued viability of the tribe’s 
sovereignty.72 
Following this mandate, the Ninth Circuit found that the right to make 
laws and enforce them is an essential element of sovereignty.73 In Settler 
v. Lameer,74 the court held that the Yakima Indian Nation had the right 
to enforce fishing regulations through arrest and seizure at its treaty-
preserved fishing sites located off-reservation.75 The court decided it is 
difficult to enforce regulations without the ability to arrest: “the power to 
regulate is only meaningful when combined with the power to 
enforce.”76 The Ninth Circuit continued this line of reasoning in Ortiz-
Barraza v. United States.77 The Ortiz-Barraza court acknowledged that a 
tribe has the power to create laws and the right to exclude violators who 
have been trespassed.78 Lacking the power to prosecute, tribes can only 
enforce their right by delivering violators to state law enforcement.79 
The Washington State Supreme Court applied this federally-created 
standard in State v. Schmuck.80 Similar to both Settler and Ortiz-Barraza, 
                                                     
69. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457–58; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431. 
70. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.  
71. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999) (“Thus, in determining whether tribes retain 
their sovereign powers, the United States Supreme Court looks to the character of the power that the 
tribe seeks to exercise, not merely the location of events.”). 
72. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008) (citing 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain 
Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 
645, 657 n.12 (2001)). 
73. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1974). 
74. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974). 
75. Id. at 239. 
76. Id. at 238. 
77. 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975). 
78. Id. at 1179; see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696–97 (1990) (“The tribes also possess 
their traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from 
tribal lands. . . . [A]nd if necessary, to eject them.”) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, 25 
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); United States 
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that tribes retain the inherent authority to “prescribe 
laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws”), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
79. Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F.2d at 1179. 
80. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 381–83, 850 P.2d 1332, 1336–37 (1993). 
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the Court stated that a fundamental aspect of creating a legal code is the 
ability to stop violators.81 In particular, a tribal officer’s inability to pull 
drivers over would render a tribal traffic code “virtually meaningless,” 
allowing non-Indians to act with impunity upon a reservation.82 The 
Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance in Oliphant and 
Duro, stating that detention by tribal officers is “a tribe’s proper 
response to crime committed by a non-Indian on the reservation.”83 The 
Schmuck Court also indicated that no court has ever held that a state’s 
assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 precludes the 
concurrent authority of tribes to stop law violators.84 Furthermore, under 
a Montana analysis, the ability to detain drivers—in particular, drunk 
drivers—significantly affects the health and welfare of the tribe.85 
Neither the removal of a tribe’s external authority nor an express 
provision of Congress prevented a tribe from exercising its sovereign 
right to enforce law through traffic stops.86 
B.  The Treaty of Point Elliott Mandates that the Party Tribes Transfer 
Violators to State Authorities 
Another method to define inherent sovereign authority is to look at 
the provisions of the relevant tribal treaty.87 As the Wheeler Court 
mandated, courts must look to express language in federal statutes and 
treaties.88 A treaty is viewed as a grant of rights from the tribe to the 
United States, and aboriginal powers are reserved unless expressly 
relinquished in the treaty.89 
However, when a Washington court analyzes an issue of Indian law, 
it is guided by two different standards.90 On one hand, because 
                                                     
81. Id. A tribe’s grant of a highway easement to a state does not extinguish the tribe’s interests in 
the land. See State v. Pink, 144 Wash. App. 945, 947, 185 P.3d 634, 635 (2008) (declaring that the 
state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a violator for unlawfully possessing a firearm on a road 
running through tribal land because the violation was not a traffic violation). 
82. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 381–83, 850 P.2d at 1336–37. 
83. Id. at 386–87, 850 P.2d at 1339 (citations omitted); see supra note 50. 
84. 121 Wash. 2d at 395–96, 850 P.2d at 1344 (quoting Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672 (8th 
Cir. 1990)). 
85. Id. at 391, 850 P.2d at 1341. 
86. Id. at 381–83, 386–91, 850 P.2d at 1336–37, 1338–42. 
87. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
88. See id. 
89. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 384, 850 P.2d at 1338. 
90. Compare Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“[S]tatutes are to 
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 
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Washington assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280, Washington 
can pass statutes affecting its own criminal and civil jurisdiction on the 
reservation.91 When interpreting a state statute, a Washington court must 
give effect to the intent of the state legislature demonstrated through the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the language unless related statutes reveal 
contrary legislative intent.92 On the other hand, when a court attempts to 
interpret an Indian treaty or a federal statute governing tribal affairs, it 
must construe the language as the Indians would naturally have 
understood the words, with any ambiguities resolved liberally in favor of 
the tribes.93 These canons of interpretation compensate for the presumed 
inferior bargaining power and knowledge of the Indians at the time of 
negotiation, and reinforce the special duty the United States government 
owes to tribes.94 
In Schmuck, the Washington State Supreme Court quashed this 
interpretive dilemma when evaluating the power of a tribal officer to 
detain non-Indian law violators.95 The Court determined that 
Washington’s assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 cannot 
undermine the provisions of the Treaty of Point Elliott (Point Elliott).96 
                                                     
benefit . . . .”) (citations omitted), with Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 
1, 11, 43 P.3d 4, 10 (2002) (“[T]he plain meaning is still derived from what the Legislature has said 
in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute 
and related statutes which disclose legislative intent . . . . [I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains 
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to 
resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.”) (citations omitted). 
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010). 
92. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d at 11, 43 P.3d at 10; Burns v. City of Seattle, 161 
Wash. 2d 129, 140, 164 P.3d 475, 481 (2007) (“Plain meaning is discerned from viewing the words 
of a particular provision in the context of the statute in which they are found, together with related 
statutory provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.”) (citing Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 
Wash. 2d at 11, 43 P.3d at 10). 
93. State v. Buchanan, 138 Wash. 2d 186, 202, 978 P.2d 1070, 1078 (1999); Blackfeet Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. at 766. 
94. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 385, 850 P.2d at 1338; see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 
316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942). 
95. 121 Wash. 2d at 393–96, 850 P.2d at 1342–44. 
96. Id. Many tribal reservations in Northwest Washington were created as a result of the 1855 
Treaty of Point Elliott. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 [hereinafter Point Elliott]; 
see also Krista J. Kapralos & Eric Stevick, Treaty’s Key Points of Contention—Document That 
Established Indian Reservations Still Debated, EVERETT HERALD (Oct. 22, 2006, 12:01 a.m.), 
available at http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20061022/NEWS01/610220766/0/rss01 [hereinafter 
Kapralos and Stevick].  
  In the treaty, northwest tribes, including the Duwamish, Suquamish, Snoqualmie, Snohomish, 
Lummi, Skagit, and Swinomish, ceded their land to the U.S. government. The treaty was part of a 
large-scale effort on the part of the U.S. government to concentrate Indians on reservations where 
they could be acculturated into civilized society. Under the guidance of an agent, the Indians 
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In regard to cross-jurisdictional authority, Article IX of the treaty states, 
“[a]nd the said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against the 
laws of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities for 
trial.”97 The Court stated that, under the Indian canons of interpretation, 
Article IX requires the detention and transfer of non-members to state 
authorities.98 A state cannot diminish rights reserved in a treaty,99 and 
Congress did not expressly divest tribes of the right to detain and 
transfer in Public Law 280.100 Nothing in Public Law 280 precludes 
concurrent jurisdiction between states and tribes.101 Such an 
interpretation is in line with Congress’s stated goal: to improve law 
enforcement on reservations.102 A court cannot read state statutes to 
exceed statutory grants of power and undermine related federal 
policies.103 Therefore, tribes have the right to stop and detain non-
Indians who violate the law within a reservation.104 
                                                     
received allotments of land, upon which they were to farm, as opposed to hunt and gather. The 
Indians were also expected to attend church and school. As one annual report of the Commissioner 
on Indian Affairs described, the U.S. supplied the tribes “with agricultural implements, mechanical 
tools, domestic animals, instructors in the useful arts, teachers, physicians, and Christian 
missionaries . . . .” ROBERT ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 
80–84 (2d ed. 2010) (reproducing a series of annual reports from the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs describing the effort to civilize Indian tribes). 
  Point Elliott created what is today called the Tulalip Reservation, and a few other temporary 
reservations. Point Elliott, supra, art. II–III; Kapralos and Stevick, supra. However, the temporary 
reservations have morphed into permanent reservations like the Lummi Reservation. Lummi 
Reservation, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD, Sep. 11, 2007, available at 
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2007/09/11/178500/lummi-reservation.html. 
97. Point Elliott, supra note 96, art. IX. (“The said tribes and bands acknowledge their 
dependence on the Government of the United States, and promise to be friendly with all citizens 
thereof, and they pledge themselves to commit no depredations on the property of such citizens. 
Should any one or more of them violate this pledge, and the fact be satisfactorily proven before the 
agent, the property taken shall be returned, or in default thereof, or if injured or destroyed, 
compensation may be made by the government out of their annuities. Nor will they make war on 
any other tribe except in self-defense, but will submit all matters of difference between them and the 
other Indians to the government of the United States or its agent for decision, and abide thereby. 
And if any of the said Indians commit depredations on other Indians within the Territory the same 
rule shall prevail as that prescribed in this article in cases of depredations against citizens. And the 
said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws of the United States, but to 
deliver them up to the authorities for trial.”). 
98. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 384–85, 850 P.2d at 1338. 
99. Id. at 393, 396, 850 P.2d at 1343–44. 
100. Id. at 396, 850 P.2d at 1344. 
101. Id. at 395, 850 P.2d at 1343 (quoting Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
102. Id. at 394–96, 850 P.2d at 1343–44. 
103. Id. at 395–96, 850 P.2d at 1344. 
104. Id. at 396, 850 P.2d at 1343. 
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III.  WASHINGTON STATUTES AUTHORIZE OFFICERS TO 
ENGAGE IN CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL FRESH PURSUIT 
The Court held in Schmuck that a tribal officer may detain non-
Indians for law violations that occur within the boundaries of the 
reservation.105 However, Schmuck did not involve cross-jurisdictional 
pursuit.106 To evaluate the authority of a tribal officer to detain non-
Indians outside of the reservation, one must consider the effects of the 
Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act,107 the Uniform Act 
on Fresh Pursuit,108 and RCW 10.92.020. 
A.  The Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act Removed 
the Requirement That the Underlying Crime Be a Felony for Fresh 
Pursuit 
The purpose of the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers 
Act (Powers Act) is to remove the “artificial barriers to mutual aid and 
cooperative enforcement of the laws among general authority local, 
state, and federal agencies.”109 Once certified as a general authority 
peace officer,110 an officer can enforce Washington traffic and criminal 
laws throughout the state so long as that officer has the consent of the 
jurisdiction in which the exercise of authority occurs, is transporting a 
prisoner, responding to an emergency, or executing a warrant.111 
Another instance in which officers can arrest outside their jurisdiction 
                                                     
105. Id.  
106. Id. at 377–78, 850 P.2d at 1333–34. 
107. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010). 
108. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.89.010–.080 (2010). 
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.001(2). 
110. The Powers Act distinguishes between a “general authority Washington law enforcement 
agency,” whose primary function is the detection of law violations (State Patrol, Department of Fish 
and Wildlife), and a “limited authority Washington law enforcement agency” that enforces laws as 
only one of its functions (the State Gambling Commission or Parks and Recreation Commission). A 
“general authority Washington peace officer” is any full-time, fully compensated employee of a 
general authority law enforcement agency, but a “limited authority Washington peace officer” can 
serve as a general authority peace officer if qualified under other sections of the act. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.93.020. 
111. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070 specifies that a general 
authority peace officer can enforce the laws of the state “throughout the territorial bounds of this 
state” in the following instances: (1) with written consent of the sheriff or chief of police in whose 
jurisdiction the “exercise of powers” occurs; (2) when responding to an emergency involving 
immediate threat to human life or property; (3) if requested to aid pursuant to a mutual assistance 
agreement by the agency or officer with enforcement authority; (4) when transporting a prisoner; (5) 
when executing a warrant; or (6) when in fresh pursuit as defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120. 
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is in fresh pursuit.112 Prior to the Powers Act, an officer could only 
engage in cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit when pursuing a suspected 
felon.113 The Powers Act broadened the instances in which an officer can 
engage in this type of pursuit: 
Any peace officer who has authority under Washington law to 
make an arrest may proceed in fresh pursuit of a person (a) who 
is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic or 
criminal laws, or (b) for whom such officer holds a warrant of 
arrest, and such peace officer shall have the authority to arrest 
and to hold such person in custody anywhere in the state.114 
Thus, a peace officer can pursue an individual who violates a traffic law 
throughout the State of Washington.115 
B.  An Officer Does Not Need to Be Certified to Enforce Washington 
Law to Engage in Cross-Jurisdictional Fresh Pursuit 
In 1943, Washington adopted the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit 
(Uniform Act).116 The Uniform Act authorizes any peace officer of 
another state to continue fresh pursuit into Washington and make a valid 
arrest for violations of that state’s laws.117 The officer must only take the 
arrested individual before a Washington magistrate to evaluate the 
lawfulness of the arrest and initiate extradition.118 The original 1943 
statute only authorized cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of suspected 
felons, but, in 1998, the legislature expanded the grant of authority to 
cover “driving while intoxicated, driving under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, driving while impaired, [and] reckless driving[.]”119 
The 1998 amendment to the Uniform Act clarified the cross-
jurisdictional rights of foreign officers in matters of drunk driving.120 For 
                                                     
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070(6). “Fresh pursuit” is not necessarily immediate pursuit, but 
is pursuit without unreasonable delay. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120. It can also be defined by the 
common law. Id. 
113. City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wash. App. 547, 550, 718 P.2d 819, 821–22 (1986), 
superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900, as recognized in Vance v. State, 116 
Wash. App. 412, 65 P.3d 668 (2003). 
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1). 
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120. 
116. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.89.010–.080 (2010); 1943 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 261, § 1. 
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.010. 
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.020. 
119. Compare 1943 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 261, § 1, with 1998 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 1.  
120. Compare In re Richie, 127 Wash. App. 935, 113 P.3d 1045 (2005), and State v. Steinbrunn, 
54 Wash. App. 506, 510–12, 774 P.2d 55, 58–59 (1989) (holding that a Washington peace officer 
could arrest an unconscious defendant in an Oregon hospital pursuant to the Uniform Act), with 
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instance, take the conflicting results of In re Richie121 and State v. 
Barker.122 In Richie, Division 3 of the Washington Court of Appeals 
indicated that an officer can lawfully arrest a drunk driver who was 
taken from Washington to an Idaho hospital.123 The key for the Richie 
court was the location of the violation.124 Conversely, in Barker, the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that an Oregon officer lacked 
authority to arrest a drunk driver who was apprehended after entering 
Washington.125 The officer lacked the authority to arrest because she had 
not completed the training program required under RCW 10.93.090.126 
However, the Court was not reviewing whether the officer had statutory 
authority to arrest the defendant in Washington under the Uniform 
Act.127 In a footnote, the Court explicitly recognized that the 1998 
amendment to the Uniform Act “clearly authorized” the officer in this 
case to pursue a person she believed to be driving under the influence 
and driving recklessly.128 Thus, both the Ritchie and Barker courts have 
indicated drunk driving is a sufficient basis to justify fresh pursuit into a 
foreign jurisdiction.129 
C.  RCW 10.92.020 Extends the Rights of Washington Officers to 
Certified Tribal Officers 
Another way the Washington State Legislature broke down territorial 
barriers to fresh pursuit is the extension of a peace officer’s authority to 
tribal officers.130 The legislature distinguishes between a general 
authority Washington peace officer, who is authorized to enforce the 
State’s laws, and a “tribal police officer,” who enforces the criminal 
laws of a federally-recognized tribe.131 To improve law enforcement on 
reservations, the legislature enacted RCW 10.92.020, authorizing tribal 
                                                     
State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423 (2001). 
121. 127 Wash. App. 935, 113 P.3d 1045 (2005). 
122. 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423 (2001). 
123. 127 Wash. App. at 942–43, 113 P.3d at 1049.  
124. Id.  
125. 143 Wash. 2d at 917–18, 25 P.3d at 424. 
126. Id. at 922, 25 P.3d at 426. 
127. Id. at 920 & n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 & n.1. The State did not file an answer to the defendant’s 
petition for discretionary review. Id. at 920, 25 P.3d at 425. 
128. Id. at 920 n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 n.1.  
129. Id.; Richie, 127 Wash. App. at 942–43, 113 P.3d at 1049. 
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010).  
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010. 
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officers to become general peace officers.132 Under the statute, a tribal 
officer can make arrests under the color of Washington law.133 
For the statute to apply, three things must occur. First, the tribe must 
request the State of Washington to certify its law enforcement agents as 
tribal officers.134 Second, the tribal government must submit proof of 
public liability and property damage insurance.135 Third, the tribe must 
reach an interlocal agreement with a local government law enforcement 
agency for cooperative law enforcement.136 
RCW 10.92.020 affords tribal officers the same powers as general 
authority peace officers.137 Therefore, a tribal officer can enforce the 
laws of Washington throughout the state in the instances enumerated in 
RCW 10.93.070, one of which is fresh pursuit.138 The statute is clear that 
the grant of power to tribes in no way expands tribal authority or allows 
for tribal arrests outside of reservation land apart from the instances 
outlined in RCW 10.93.070.139 However, the statute explicitly states that 
nothing in it altered the inherent sovereign authority of the State’s 
tribes.140 It only extended to tribal officers the authority of a general 
authority Washington peace officer to enforce Washington law.141 
                                                     
132. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7 (“[Tribes] needed law enforcement just on 
the reservation . . . . [Bad actors] would [leave] the reservation, [violate the law,] then come 
back . . . . [T]here was difficulty [prosecuting] the [bad actors] because they were bouncing back 
and forth [between jurisdictions] . . . . [After I was elected,] I started working on [tribal law 
enforcement legislation and,] . . . now that there is cross-deputization[,] . . . it’s easier to make an 
arrest and get a conviction.”). 
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020. 
134. Id. To accomplish this, the tribal government must enter a written agreement with the 
Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.157(1) 
(2010). The Training Commission provides law enforcement training for all criminal justice 
personnel in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.200. To be certified as a tribal officer, one 
must meet the same requirements as an individual who seeks certification as a general authority 
peace officer. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.157(1)–(2). The applicant must also undergo a 
background check, psychological examination, and a polygraph test. WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 43.101.095. 
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(2)(a). 
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(10). 
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(1). 
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(5) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070(6); see supra note 
111. 
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(4); see supra note 111. 
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(7). 
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(1). 
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IV.  WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL AND STATE 
LAW, THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 
DECIDED THE THREE ERIKSEN CASES 
The question of a tribal officer’s inherent authority to continue cross-
jurisdictional fresh pursuit arose in State v. Eriksen.142 On August 10, 
2005, Officer Mike McSwain of the Lummi Nation Police Department 
was patrolling the Lummi Reservation when an approaching vehicle 
with its high beams on swerved across the center line and almost struck 
the officer’s marked car.143 Officer McSwain turned his car around, 
activated his overhead lights, and followed the other car.144 The pursued 
vehicle did not stop until arriving at a gas station located off the 
reservation.145 As Officer McSwain approached the vehicle, he observed 
the driver, Loretta Lynn Eriksen, switch places with the front seat 
passenger in an attempt to evade detection.146 After asking for Eriksen’s 
license, Officer McSwain determined she was not a tribal member.147 He 
noted that Eriksen “smelled strongly of intoxicants, had bloodshot and 
watery eyes, and spoke in slightly slurred speech.”148 Officer McSwain 
promptly called for a Whatcom County deputy sheriff.149 While waiting 
for the deputy sheriff to arrive, he asked Eriksen to step from the car 
and, without performing any sobriety tests or collecting any evidence, 
put her in the back of his patrol car.150 When the deputy sheriff arrived, 
the sheriff arrested Eriksen.151 
After a trial in Whatcom County District Court, a jury convicted 
Eriksen of driving under the influence.152 At trial, she moved to suppress 
evidence and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that 
Officer McSwain did not have the authority to stop and detain her off 
tribal land.153 No party questioned the presence of probable cause for a 
                                                     
142. State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 507, 259 P.3d 1079, 1079–80 (2011). 
143. Id. at 507–08. The Lummi Nation Code of Laws 6.04.050(a) (2008) mandates that drivers 
use low beams within 500 feet of oncoming vehicles. 
144. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 508, 259 P.3d at 1080. 
145. Id. Under Lummi law, eluding an officer is a Class B offense, one step below a felony. 
Lummi Nation Code of Laws 6A.02.110 (2008); Lummi Nation Code of Laws 5.10.090 (2008). 




150. Id. at 508–09, 259 P.3d at 1080. 
151. Id. at 509, 259 P.3d at 1080. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
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Terry stop,154 or that the Lummi tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over 
Eriksen.155 The district court denied the motion, and, on appeal, the 
Whatcom County Superior Court upheld the conviction.156 Both courts 
reasoned that the Lummi Nation’s inherent sovereign power authorizes 
tribal police to enforce internal criminal laws by pursuing offenders who 
leave the reservation.157 
A.  In Eriksen I, the Washington State Supreme Court Upheld the 
Arrest Because the Canons of Interpretation and a Tribe’s Inherent 
Sovereign Authority Mandate Its Ability to Enforce Its Own Laws 
In 2009, the Washington State Supreme Court granted discretionary 
review of the Whatcom County Superior Court’s decision to affirm 
Eriksen’s conviction in the first State v. Eriksen (Eriksen I).158 A 
unanimous court upheld the arrest.159 Justice Sanders, writing for the 
Court, held that “tribal officers have the inherent sovereign authority and 
statutory authority to continue fresh pursuit of motorists who break 
traffic laws on the reservation and then drive off the reservation.”160 The 
Court based its decision on a tribe’s inherent power to uphold the law on 
the reservation and the legislature’s effort to improve cross-jurisdictional 
crime prevention.161 
Based on Schmuck and Ortiz-Barraza, the Court stated that tribes 
have the power to detain non-Indians who violate the law on public 
roads within the reservation.162 A tribe’s authority over events occurring 
on its land is an inherent power that has never been extinguished.163 
Thus, tribes have an inherent interest in protecting self-government 
                                                     
154. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot . . . [the officer can] make[ ] reasonable inquiries.”). 
155. See Brief for Lummi Nation as Amicus Curiae Supporting the State at 2, State v. Eriksen 
(Eriksen I), 166 Wash. 2d 953, 216 P.3d 382 (2009), superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen II), 
170 Wash. 2d 209, 241 P.3d 399 (2010) (No. 80653-5); Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 507, 259 P.3d 
at 1079–80.  
156. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 509, 259 P.3d at 1080.  
157. Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d at 959, 216 P.3d at 385. 
158. 166 Wash. 2d 953, 959, 216 P.3d 382, 385 (2009), superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen 
II), 170 Wash. 2d 209, 241 P.3d 399 (2010). 
159. Id. at 957, 974, 216 P.3d at 384, 393. 
160. Id. at 957, 216 P.3d at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161. Id. at 973–74, 216 P.3d at 393. 
162. Id. at 961, 216 P.3d at 386 (citations omitted). 
163. Id. at 962, 216 P.3d at 387. 
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through the creation and enforcement of an internal criminal code.164 In 
fact, tribal parties to Point Elliott affirmatively agreed to deliver law-
breakers to the proper authorities.165 In the particular instance of a 
fleeing drunk driver, it is only through detaining violators that a tribe can 
simultaneously protect its own interests and uphold its duty to aid law 
enforcement.166 
The Court next applied the second Montana exception.167 The Court 
expressly identified that an inability to enforce a traffic code is a direct 
threat to a tribe’s political integrity.168 The inherent power of self-
governance is only practical if the tribe can enforce its internal laws.169 
The Court reasoned that if it authorized non-Indians to escape 
prosecution simply by successfully winning a race to the reservation 
boundary, it would undermine the holding from Schmuck.170 
In the last part of its analysis, the Court found that the Powers Act 
gives tribes the statutory authority to enforce their internal laws in the 
event of fresh pursuit off the reservation.171 The Court contended that a 
general authority Washington law enforcement agency is any “political 
subdivision . . . having as its primary function the detection and 
apprehension of persons committing infractions or violating the traffic or 
criminal laws in general . . . .”172 Because the legislature directed courts 
to “liberally construe” the provisions of the Powers Act,173 tribal officers 
were general authority officers and could cross-jurisdictional boundaries 
when in fresh pursuit.174 
B.  In Eriksen II, the Court Upheld the Arrest Because a Tribe Retains 
Its Inherent Sovereign Authority to Enforce Its Own Laws. 
In 2010, Ms. Eriksen petitioned for reconsideration175 and the Court 
                                                     
164. Id. at 963, 216 P.3d at 387. 
165. Id. at 962–63, 216 P.3d at 387 (citing State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 385, 850 P.2d 
1332, 1338 (1993)). 
166. Id. at 965–66, 216 P.3d at 388–89. 
167. Id. at 964, 216 P.3d at 388 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)). 
168. Id. at 965, 216 P.3d at 388. 
169. Id. (quoting Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 392, 850 P.2d at 1342).  
170. Id. at 966, 216 P.3d at 389. 
171. Id. at 972–74, 216 P.3d at 392–93. 
172. Id. at 971, 216 P.3d at 391(emphasis omitted) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1) 
(2010)). 
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.001(3).  
174. Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d at 973–74, 216 P.3d at 393. 
175. Motion to Reconsider of Petitioner at 1, Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d 953, 216 P.3d 382 (No. 06-
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granted review in the second State v. Eriksen (Eriksen II).176 Justice 
Sanders, writing for a 6-3 court,177 again affirmed the conviction, 
holding that tribal officers possess the inherent authority to continue 
fresh pursuit off reservation land.178 
Justice Sanders replicated much of the Court’s analysis from 
Eriksen I.179 In Eriksen II, the Court also explained that a determination 
of inherent sovereign power is based on “the character of the power that 
the tribe seeks to exercise, not merely the location of events.”180 It is the 
vital nature of a tribe’s ability to enforce the law, protect the safety of 
tribal members, and control events on tribal land that mandates the 
recognition of the inherent sovereign authority to continue fresh pursuit 
of a suspected criminal, in particular a drunk driver.181 However, in a 
reversal from Eriksen I, the Court did not assert that a tribal officer is by 
definition a general authority Washington peace officer under the 
Powers Act.182 The Court only noted that the Powers Act does not 
explicitly bar a tribal officer’s authority to detain after fresh pursuit.183 
Justice Fairhurst authored the dissenting opinion.184 Although the 
dissenters agreed that a tribal officer may pursue a driver off the 
reservation, they argued that there is no authority to support a 
subsequent detention once a lack of tribal status is ascertained.185 The 
mandate to interpret treaties liberally and resolve ambiguities in favor of 
                                                     
1-00516-6) (Eriksen argued the Court incorrectly equated the Lummi tribal police to a general 
authority Washington law enforcement agency under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.020(1) because the 
tribe is not a political subdivision of the state, nor does it enforce state laws. Furthermore, like the 
Oregon police officer in Barker, the tribe decided not to comply with the certification requirements 
under Chapter 10.93, thus limiting its ability to continue fresh pursuit.). The Washington State 
Supreme Court will grant a motion for reconsideration if the party has demonstrated the Court 
overlooked or misapprehended the law or a fact. WASH. R. APP. P. 12.4. 
176. 170 Wash. 2d 209, 215, 241 P.3d 399, 402 (2010), superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen 
III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011). 
177. Id. at 226, 241 P.3d at 408 (joined by Justices C. Johnson, Chambers, Owens, J. Johnson, 
and Stephens). 
178. Id. at 226, 241 P.3d at 407. 
179. See supra Part IV.A for Justice Sanders’s analysis in Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d 953, 216 P.3d 
382. Among other determinations, the Court recognized both a tribe’s right to protect self-
government by enforcing law within the reservation and the duty created under Point Elliott. 
180. 170 Wash. 2d at 216, 241 P.3d at 402 (quoting John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 
1999)).  
181. Id. at 218–22, 241 P.3d at 403–05 (citations omitted).  
182. Id. at 225–26, 241 P.3d at 407.  
183. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1) (2010)). 
184. Id. at 226–30, 241 P.3d at 408–09 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Madsen 
and Justice Alexander). 
185. Id. at 227, 241 P.3d at 409. 
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tribes is “not a blank check to rewrite the language of a treaty, even to 
avoid an injustice.”186 The tribal officer may only notify a general 
authority Washington peace officer that a car with a particular 
description is travelling down a road.187 The dissenters acknowledged 
that their conclusion requires an officer to allow a drunk driver to 
continue driving, but stressed that current law dictated invalidating the 
arrest.188 To prevent this result in the future, they recommended that 
either tribes have their officers certified under RCW 10.92.020 or the 
legislature extend statutory fresh pursuit to tribal officers.189 
C.  In Eriksen III, the Court Declared the Arrest Invalid Because 
Tribal Officers Lack the Authority to Detain Outside the Territorial 
Limits of Their Jurisdiction 
In 2011, Ms. Eriksen moved for reconsideration a second time,190 and 
the Washington State Supreme Court granted review in Eriksen III.191 
For Eriksen, the third time was the charm, as Justice Fairhurst, writing 
for a 5-4 court,192 invalidated the conviction and held that fresh pursuit 
off tribal land is not within the inherent sovereign power of an Indian 
tribe.193 
                                                     
186. Id. at 229, 241 P.3d at 409 (citing Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 
335, 353 (1945)).  
187. Id. 
188. Id.  
189. Id. at 230, 241 P.3d at 409. 
190. Motion to Reconsider of Petitioner at 1, Eriksen II, 170 Wash. 2d 209, 241 P.3d 399 (No. 
80653-5) (Eriksen argued there was no factual support for the application of common law fresh 
pursuit as the justices only assumed felony eluding a police officer occurred here. Without a 
felony—and reckless driving is not one—there were no grounds to allow cross-jurisdictional 
pursuit. Because a Lummi officer is not a general authority Washington police officer, the Court 
could not find statutory basis to allow fresh pursuit, and, as Eriksen asserted, common law fresh 
pursuit does not survive WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020. Also, she claimed that Eriksen II frustrates 
the purpose of that statute because it would not hold tribal officers to the same training standards as 
general authority Washington police officers. Next, she contended the application of the second 
Montana exception was misplaced because the regulation of fishing at issue in that case was still 
within the boundaries of Indian Country. Non-tribal land within a reservation is different from non-
tribal land outside a reservation. And finally, she posited that the Treaty of Point Elliott did not 
expressly authorize the detention of non-members off Indian land.). 
191. 172 Wash. 2d 506, 509, 259 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2011).  
192. Id. at 506, 516, 259 P.3d at 1079, 1084 (joined by Chief Justice Madsen, Justices J. Johnson, 
Stephens, and Wiggins). 
193. Id. at 515–16, 259 P.3d at 1084. In the time between Eriksen II and Eriksen III, the only 
change on the Court was that Justice Wiggins replaced Justice Sanders (who wrote the majority 
opinions in Eriksen I and Eriksen II), and he voted to overturn the conviction. Besides this single 
personnel change, Justices J. Johnson and Stephens shifted from upholding the arrest to invalidating 
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The Court reversed the conviction for three main reasons: (1) “the 
concept of territorial jurisdiction necessarily limits” the tribe’s authority 
to enforce tribal law and protect the safety of tribal members; (2) 
Washington provides an avenue through which tribal officers can be 
certified as general authority Washington peace officers with the 
authority to continue fresh pursuit of violators; and (3) Article IX of 
Point Elliott is designed to prevent tribes from granting safe harbor to 
non-Indians seeking asylum from criminal prosecutions and does not 
pertain to persons who leave tribal jurisdiction before detention.194 The 
Court cited Barker for the proposition that territorial boundaries limit 
law enforcement officers when neither statute nor common law 
authorizes cross-jurisdictional pursuit.195 Additionally, the Court 
contended Settler only supports off-reservation arrests for violations of 
tribal fishing regulations at “usual and accustomed fishing sites” 
reserved in Point Elliott.196 If the officer had detained Eriksen on the 
reservation, then the provisions of Point Elliott would govern the 
detention of non-members as in Schmuck.197 The Court next dismissed 
the application of the second Montana exception because that case was 
about civil, not criminal, jurisdiction.198 Finally, echoing the dissent in 
Eriksen II, the Court acknowledged the negative policy results of its 
decision, but reasoned that the relevant law required this outcome.199 
Justice Owens authored a dissenting opinion.200 In the opinion, the 
                                                     
it, while Justice Alexander went the opposite direction. Compare Eriksen II, 170 Wash. 2d at 212, 
226, 230, 241 P.3d at 400, 408–09, with Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 516, 523, 259 P.3d at 1084, 
1087. 
194. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 509–14, 259 P.3d at 1081–83. 
195. Id. at 510, 512, 259 P.3d at 1081–82 (citations omitted). 
196. Id. at 512–13, 259 P.3d at 1082 (citing Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 231 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
197. Id. at 513, 259 P.3d at 1082–83. 
198. Id. at 513–14, 259 P.3d at 1083.  
199. Id. at 514–15, 259 P.3d at 1083. 
200. Id. at 518–23, 259 P.3d at 1085–87 (Owens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices C. Johnson 
and Chambers). Justice Alexander dissented separately. Id. at 516–18, 259 P.3d at 1084–85 
(Alexander, J., dissenting). In his opinion, the conviction should be affirmed because the officer’s 
detention of Eriksen was a valid citizen’s arrest. Id. at 518, 259 P.3d at 1085. He cited State v. 
Malone, 106 Wash. 2d 607, 609 n.1, 724 P.2d 364, 365 n.1 (1986) as support for the well-settled 
common law standard that an individual can arrest “a person who is committing a felony or a 
misdemeanor in the citizen’s presence if the offense is a breach of the peace.” Eriksen III, 172 
Wash. 2d at 516, 259 P.3d at 1084 (footnote omitted) (citing Malone, 106 Wash. 2d at 609 n.1, 724 
P.2d at 365 n.1). In Malone, an officer from Idaho pursued a driver into Washington in a similar 
manner to Officer McSwain’s pursuit of Eriksen and the Court deemed the subsequent detention a 
valid citizen’s arrest. Id. In Justice Alexander’s opinion, driving under the influence is a breach of 
peace because the act creates the risk of serious harm. Id. at 516–17, 259 P.3d at 1084–85. 
Furthermore, Justice Alexander argued the arrest was valid because the tribal officer did not gather 
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dissenters argued that the ability of a tribe to detain a non-Indian who 
threatens the welfare of tribal members is well established in state and 
federal law.201 The dissenters noted that a court must not interpret 
inherent tribal authority in terms of state statutes, but interpret statutes in 
relation to the tribe’s inherent authority.202 Therefore, the majority’s 
decision undermines the federal and state legal foundations of inherent 
sovereign authority.203 
V.  ERIKSEN III IS BOTH CONTRARY TO STATE AND 
FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND DETRIMENTAL TO PUBLIC 
POLICY AND SAFETY 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in Eriksen III 
contains flawed legal analysis and ignores the public policy directives of 
the Washington State Legislature. First, a court cannot read a state 
statute to limit a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority.204 The Court did 
this when it stated that a tribal officer cannot continue fresh pursuit if the 
tribe fails to achieve certification under RCW 10.92.020.205 A tribe 
retains all rights not relinquished in a treaty, expressly taken by 
Congress, or inconsistent with its status as a domestic dependent 
nation.206 Neither a Congressional statute nor Point Elliott has removed 
the power of detention from tribes. In fact, Point Elliott placed this 
burden upon them.207 Second, the Court’s interpretation of RCW 
                                                     
any evidence besides what an average citizen could in a similar situation. Id. at 517–18, 259 P.3d at 
1084–85. 
201. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 518, 520, 259 P.3d at 1085–87 (citations omitted). For this 
proposition, Justice Owens cited to the cases covered throughout this Comment, including State v. 
Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993), and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States 
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 518–19, 259 P.3d at 1085–86 (citations 
omitted). 
202. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 522, 259 P.3d at 1087 (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of 
Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). 
203. See id. at 522–23, 259 P.3d at 1087. 
204. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987); White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42, 151 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 
(1905). 
205. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 514, 259 P.3d at 1083. 
206. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
207. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 384–85, 850 P.2d 1332, 1338 (stating that Article IX 
requires tribes to detain and transfer non-member violators to state authorities); Point Elliott, supra 
note 96, art. IX. 
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10.92.020 as a limitation on tribal police power runs counter to the 
statute’s express language and the legislature’s intent. Third, the Court’s 
contention that territorial boundaries necessarily limit jurisdiction is 
unfounded within the precedent the Court cited. Finally, Eriksen III 
incentivizes all non-Indian violators, not just drunk drivers, to attempt 
flight from pursuing tribal officers. This can lead to high-speed pursuit, 
endangering the lives of citizens both on and off the reservation. Based 
on these four points, it is evident the Court both performed the wrong 
analysis for inherent sovereign authority and should have upheld the 
arrest and conviction of Loretta Lynn Eriksen.208 
A.  Federal Law Does Not Limit a Tribe’s Authority to Pursue a Non-
Indian Violator, Providing No Basis for a State to Restrict This 
Ability 
A tribe retains the inherent sovereign authority to enforce laws and 
ensure safety on its reservation.209 A state’s interests, even if it has 
assumed jurisdiction over tribal reservations under Public Law 280, do 
not destroy a tribe’s sovereignty over both its members and its 
territory.210 By definition, tribes maintain their inherent authority over 
the aspects of self-government not expressly given away by treaty, taken 
by Congressional statute, or implicitly removed as a result of their 
dependent status.211 The authority to continue fresh pursuit off a 
reservation, ascertain the status of the violator, and then contact a state 
law enforcement officer, has never been expressly removed, and is 
consistent with both the reserved right to protect member safety and the 
nature of being a dependent nation.212 
                                                     
208. It is not clear why the conviction of Eriksen was invalid once the arrest was declared invalid. 
An unlawful arrest does not necessarily derail a conviction. It is the inadmissibility of any evidence 
gathered pursuant to that arrest that can ruin a conviction. See State v. Melrose, 2 Wash. App. 824, 
828, 470 P.2d 552, 555 (1970). Officer McSwain did not gather any evidence beyond simple 
observation before the deputy sheriff arrived and placed Eriksen under arrest. See Eriksen III, 172 
Wash. 2d at 508–09, 259 P.3d at 1080. The deputy sheriff performed all sobriety tests. See id. The 
majority did not address this issue in Eriksen III. See id. at 506–16, 259 P.3d at 1079–84. 
209. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (“Essentially, absent governing Acts of 
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 
566 (1981) (recognizing the second exception).  
210. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980); United States v. 
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
211. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193.  
212. See infra Parts V.A.1–.3. 
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1.  The Tribal Parties to the Treaty of Point Elliot Did Not Cede the 
Ability to Protect Safety on Their Reservations or Aide States in 
Enforcing the Law 
The Eriksen III majority suggested that the only concern addressed in 
Article IX of Point Elliott is the fear that American criminals would seek 
asylum on reservations.213 The Court also insinuated that only those 
rights expressly reserved in a treaty are protected rights.214 While Justice 
Fairhurst is correct that the Indian canons of interpretation are “not a 
blank check to rewrite the [treaty],”215 a court should not then read 
concessions of rights not stated in the treaty. According to federal law, 
absent an explicit provision, courts must liberally construe treaties in 
favor of the Indians and as the tribes would have understood them.216 In 
1832, twenty-three years prior to Point Elliott, the U.S. Supreme Court 
suggested that the correct interpretation of treaties is as grants of rights 
by the tribes.217 Rights not expressly given to the United States are 
reserved to tribes.218 Nowhere in Point Elliott do the tribes expressly 
relinquish the right to inform U.S. officials of law violations; in fact, 
they affirmatively agreed to this burden.219 
Courts must interpret Point Elliot from the perspective of how the 
tribes understood it.220 According to the terms of the treaty, the tribes 
agreed to relocate to reservations, ceding their claims to the land they 
                                                     
213. 172 Wash. 2d at 513, 259 P.3d at 1082. 
214. See id. at 512–13, 259 P.3d at 1082–83. 
215. State v. Eriksen (Eriksen II), 170 Wash. 2d 209, 229, 241 P.3d 399, 409 (2010) (Fairhurst, 
J., dissenting) (citing Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945)), 
superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III) 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011). 
216. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); State v. Buchanan, 138 
Wash. 2d 186, 202, 978 P.2d 1070, 1078 (1999); State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 385, 850 
P.2d 1332, 1338 (1993); see text accompanying supra notes 93–94 for discussion about the liberal 
canons of interpretation for Indian treaties. 
217. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552–54 (1832), abrogation recognized in 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 
402 (1993) (“[In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall] conceptualized an Indian treaty as a grant of 
rights from a tribe to the United State, rather than a cession of all tribal rights to the United States, 
which then granted back certain concessions to the tribe.”). 
218. Frickey, supra note 217, at 402.  
219. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 384–86, 850 P.2d at 1338 (stating that Article IX requires 
tribes to detain and transfer non-member violators to state authorities); Point Elliott, supra note 96, 
art. IX. 
220. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 385, 850 P.2d at 1338; see text accompanying supra notes 93–94 
for discussion about the liberal canons of interpretation for Indian treaties. 
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occupied, and in return received the protection of the United States,221 
monetary payments, the guarantee of land, and access to traditional 
fishing and hunting grounds.222 The agreement to not “shelter or 
conceal” law violators is part of a larger section in which the tribes 
accepted the U.S. government as an arbitrator in their tribal disputes and 
consented to report all crimes to the government’s agent.223 Tribal 
acceptance of U.S. guardianship, and agreement to reveal law violators, 
was a way of showing allegiance.224 The protection of U.S. law would 
have been of little comfort to the tribes if a violator escaped liability 
simply by fleeing to U.S. soil.225 
Contemporary concepts of criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country 
support this interpretation of tribal understanding. For example, 
Congress enacted the Indian Country Crimes Act,226 which created 
federal jurisdiction over any cross-racial crimes in Indian Country.227 
This law was a direct descendant of the Trade and Intercourse statutes 
that attempted to control lawless whites and ensure peaceful relations on 
the Western frontier.228 Rather than focus solely on asylum seekers, 
these statutes sought to limit gaps in prosecutions for cross-racial 
crimes.229 It is clear that Congress directed efforts toward curtailing 
lawlessness within tribal territory.230 
                                                     
221. See generally Point Elliott, supra note 96. “The said tribes . . . promise to be friendly with all 
citizens [of the United States], and they pledge themselves to commit no depredations on the 
property of such citizens. Should any one or more of them violate this pledge, and the fact be 
satisfactorily proven before the agent, the property taken shall be returned . . . . And if any of the 
said Indians commit depredations on other Indians within the Territory the same rule shall prevail as 
that prescribed in this article in cases of depredations against citizens.” Id. art. IX.  
222. Id. art. III, V, VII. 
223. Id. art. IX; see supra note 97 for full text of Article IX. 
224. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 569 (1883) (The bad men clauses are an 
“acknowledgment of their allegiance, as Indians, to the laws of the United States, made or to be 
made in the exercise of legislative authority over them as such.”), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (2006), as recognized in United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). See supra 
note 96 for background on the establishment of reservations.  
225. This is in line with Duro, and many other cases, in which the Court said tribes must maintain 
the power to detain non-members to prevent impunity for lack of criminal jurisdiction. Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696–97 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as 
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006). 
227. Id. 
228. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 92 (1984). 
229. See generally Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
230. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (extending federal criminal jurisdiction to cover 
crimes committed by one Indian against another); 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). 
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Other tribal treaties offer examples of intentions to protect law and 
order upon tribal land.231 In 1868, the Navajo agreed to relocate to a 
reservation.232 As part of the agreement, the U.S. government promised 
to punish violators of U.S. laws, either white or Indian, if they 
committed a cross-racial crime.233 This so-called “bad men clause” 
reflects the ideas expressed in the Indian Country Crimes Act. The 
understanding was that violators of U.S. law on reservation land faced 
criminal prosecution.234 Because concerns of lawlessness pervaded the 
period, a court should view Article IX as a shorthand version of similar 
efforts to enforce law within Indian Country. 
Furthermore, the language of Article IX does not support Eriksen III’s 
interpretation.235 The treaty requires tribes to identify violators but does 
not geographically limit this duty. The language in no way limits its 
application to situations of persons seeking asylum within the 
reservation. The treaty did not expressly remove the power to report 
crime; in fact, the tribes expressly accepted the burden.236 As the 
Washington State Supreme Court stated in Schmuck, Article IX instructs 
tribes to detain non-Indian law violators and transfer them to state 
officers.237 This conclusion is founded in both the language of the treaty 
and in an analysis under the Indian canons of interpretation.238 
Nowhere in Point Elliott do the party tribes relinquish the right to 
pursue law violators. In fact, they took on the burden of reporting crime 
to the United States. Without express relinquishment, tribes retain 
aspects of sovereign power. Only a subsequent express act of Congress 
can remove the reserved right to “deliver [violators] up to the authorities 
for trial.”239 
                                                     
231. See Treaty with the Cherokees, art. V, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478; Treaty with the Choctaw, 
art. XIII, Oct. 18, 1820, 7 Stat. 210; Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawa, 
Chipewas, Putawatimes, Miamis, Eel-river, Weea’s, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias, art. 
VI, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49; Treaty with the Chickasaws, art. V, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24.  
232. Treaty with the Navajo, art. II, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667. 
233. Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. at 557–58. 
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Treaty with the Navajo, supra note 232, art. I. 
235. See supra note 97 for full text of Article IX. 
236. Point Elliott, supra note 96, art. IX. 
237. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 387, 850 P.2d 1332, 1339 (1993). 
238. See generally Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332. 
239. Point Elliott, supra note 96, art. IX; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), 
superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193 (2004). 
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2. Congress Has Not Limited a Tribal Officer’s Ability to Detain 
Violators and Transfer Them to Proper Authorities 
A tribe retains powers not ceded in a treaty unless Congress explicitly 
removes that right or abrogates the treaty.240 Until Congress speaks on 
the matter, a party tribe to Point Elliot retains the right and the obligation 
to help the United States identify law violators.241 Washington cannot 
remove reserved treaty rights from a tribe that Congress itself has not 
taken, nor can the State undermine Congressional goals in Indian 
affairs.242 Congress has not explicitly restricted a tribe’s authority to 
detain individuals who violated law on the reservations simply because 
pursuit continued off-reservation. Congress has only expressly 
acknowledged a need to improve law enforcement within Indian 
Country.243 
One example of Congress’s efforts to improve law and order within 
Indian Country is Public Law 280.244 In 1953, Congress sought to 
combat perceived lawlessness on reservations by authorizing states to 
assume criminal and (limited) civil jurisdiction over reservations within 
their borders.245 Prior to Public Law 280, there were prosecutorial gaps 
for criminal offenses on reservations.246 Federal prosecutors were not 
geared to handle minor criminal prosecutions,247 and tribes only had 
                                                     
240. See supra Part I; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903), abrogated by 
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977). 
241. See supra Part V.A.1. 
242. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987); White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42, 151 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 
(1905). 
243. See supra Part V.A.1; see also Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (extending 
federal criminal jurisdiction to cover crimes committed by one Indian against another); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). See generally Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27 (outlining 
Congressional efforts to use Public Law 280 to combat lawlessness on Indian reservations). 
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360; see text accompanying supra notes 23–30 for 
discussion of the enactment of Public Law 280. 
245. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1406. 
246. See id. at 1412–13, 1416. However, an unintended result of Public Law 280 may have been 
to increase the lawlessness on the reservation because many states were unwilling to pick up the 
duties once the federal government stopped providing law enforcement. Id. at 1416–18, 1441. 
247. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Federal law is not designed to 
cover the range of conduct normally regulated by local governments. Minor offenses committed by 
non-Indians within Indian reservations frequently go unpunished and thus unregulated.”), rev’d, 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
11 - Naud Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012  7:40 PM 
1280 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:1251 
 
jurisdiction over Indian violators.248 Compounding the problem, tribes 
often lacked the resources to prosecute major offenses and could only 
render limited sentences under the Indian Civil Rights Act.249 Congress’s 
solution was to substitute state authority for federal.250 This 
interpretation of the intent behind Public Law 280 is in line with 
Washington case law.251 
The enactment of Public Law 280 is not the only evidence of 
Congress’s goal to improve law and order on reservations. In her article, 
Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian 
Country,252 Professor Carole Goldberg-Ambrose argued that states that 
have assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280 are reluctant to direct 
their full effort toward combating crime in Indian Country.253 
Furthermore, the states and tribes do not receive pre-Public Law 280 
levels of financial support from the federal government because that 
money is concentrated on law enforcement efforts in states lacking 
jurisdiction over Indian Country.254 The lack of funding is particularly 
evident in tribal law enforcement and tribal courts.255 Because state 
jurisdiction only exacerbated lawlessness on reservations,256 Congress 
has recognized the ability of states to retrocede jurisdiction to the federal 
government.257 
While Professor Goldberg-Ambrose’s study focused on California, 
Washington State has also felt the negative effects of continued 
jurisdictional gaps.258 To alleviate this problem, the Washington State 
                                                     
248. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1415. 
249. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B)–(D) (2006) (limiting the extent of punishment a tribal court can 
mete out for any one crime to one year or a fine of $5000 for first time offenders and minor crimes, 
and three years or a fine of $15,000 for repeat offenders or major offenses). 
250. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1415. 
251. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 394, 850 P.2d 1332, 1343 (1993). 
252. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California 
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997). 
253. Id. at 1416–18, 1441 (suggesting that there were direct and indirect negative effects on the 
nature of law enforcement within Indian Country as a result of Public Law 280). 
254. Id. at 1417. 
255. Id. at 1418. 
256. Id. at 1416–19.  
257. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006). 
258. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7. According to Representative McCoy: 
[Tribes, like the Tulalip, were] working with county sheriffs on law enforcement 
issues. . . . [On the Tulalip Reservation,] there was only one [state] officer in the whole north 
country sector at night. During day time, there might be two officers in the whole north country 
sector. . . . That’s a lot of ground to cover . . . . That one officer’s doing the best he could but 
[there were] still issues. . . . [Bad actors] would [leave] the reservation, [violate the law,] then 
come back . . . . 
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Legislature sought to improve law enforcement upon tribal land within 
the state.259 For instance, the impetus behind RCW 10.92.020 was three-
fold: (1) to prevent criminals from hopping between jurisdictions to 
avoid prosecution; (2) to remove reliance on the availability of peace 
officers to arrest violators; and (3) to force local law enforcement 
agencies to negotiate interlocal agreements with tribes.260 The 
legislature, too, has created a process through which tribes can request 
retrocession of jurisdiction.261 
Congress has not expressly addressed the question of tribal cross-
jurisdictional fresh pursuit. What Congress has expressly demonstrated 
is intent to improve law enforcement within reservations.262 Public Law 
280 illustrates this effort.263 States cannot contravene Congressional 
goals without express permission.264 Therefore, the State of Washington 
                                                     
. . . [Also,] Domestic Violence . . . was a big problem because of the mixed relationships 
[between] a non-Indian and an Indian. . . . [For instance, if] an Indian female [was] getting beat 
up by a [non-Indian, the tribe could not] do anything about it. . . . [Tribes, in general, also] had 
major drug [trafficking] problems. . . . 
. . . [In the instance of a traffic stop,] before cross-deputization, if there was a non-Indian 
involved, the only thing [tribal officers] could do [was] detain, and then . . . call the Sheriff’s 
Department or State Patrol [to inform them that a non-Indian had been] apprehended. Could 
have been a DUI or speeding or whatever, but if [the state officer was] busy and nobody came, 
well, [a tribal officer] can’t detain forever. All [the tribal officer] can do is record . . . the stop 
and let the [non-Indian] go . . . . 
Id. 
259. See supra Part III.C for discussion of the Washington State Legislature’s efforts to improve 
law enforcement on Indian reservations, in particular, its enactment of WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 10.92.010–.020 (2010). 
260. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7. Representative McCoy described the 
impetus behind WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020: 
[In WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020,] there is a process that if [a local] sheriff fails to negotiate 
[an interlocal agreement with a neighboring tribe] fairly and equally, . . . a 
mechanism . . . triggers [as a legal hammer]. . . . [Outside of that, the] impetus [behind] the bill 
was [tribes had] bad actors that were bouncing back and forth [between jurisdictions], trying to 
use the shield of [tribal] trust land [to prevent successful prosecutions] . . . .  
. . . [Also], now that there is cross-deputization, . . . it’s easier to make an arrest and get a 
conviction. . . . [B]efore cross-deputization, if there was a non-Indian involved, the only thing 
[tribal officers] could do [was] detain, and then . . . call to the Sheriff’s Department or State 
Patrol [to inform them that a non-Indian had been] apprehended. Could have been a DUI or 
speeding or whatever, but if [the state officer was] busy and nobody came, well, [a tribal 
officer] can’t detain forever. All [the tribal officer] can do is record . . . the stop and let the 
[non-Indian] go, which was serving no one’s best interests. 
Id.; see infra Part V.B.  
261. ESHB 2233, ch. 48 § 1, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified as WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)). The governor has discretion to accept or decline the tribal request within 
one year of the request. Id. 
262. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152–1153, 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). 
263. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1406.  
264. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42, 151 (1980); 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980). 
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cannot limit a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to detain and reveal 
non-Indian violators unless such a right is removed as a consequence of 
the tribe’s dependent status.265 
3.  In the Absence of Congressional Action, a Court Must Analyze the 
Importance of the Right in Question and Its Relation to a Tribe’s 
Dependent Status 
The last way to define a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority is to 
analyze whether the right is inconsistent with its dependent status. The 
U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Oliphant that a tribe is implicitly 
divested of a right when that right is inconsistent with an overriding 
federal interest.266 Additionally, in Montana, the Court stated that tribal 
authority does not cover rights that are unnecessary to safeguard self-
government or regulate internal relations.267 However, the Court did 
declare two exceptions, the second of which instructs that tribes retain 
authority over actions that “threaten[ ] or ha[ve] some direct effect on 
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of 
the tribe.”268 Without the ability to detain violators, tribes are deprived of 
their basic right to determine the conditions upon which a person can 
enter a reservation and to exclude people who violate those terms.269 
This right is necessary to the survival of tribal government and is not 
implicitly removed by dependent status.270  
A tribe possesses the ability to enforce their own law. As described 
above in Part V.A.2, improving law enforcement within Indian Country 
is an overriding federal interest. Therefore, a tribe’s interest in upholding 
law and order is consistent with a federal interest. Also, a tribe’s 
inability to prevent drunk driving is detrimental to both its self-
government and safety because it would render its legal code “virtually 
meaningless.”271 Granted, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strate indicated 
that mere “careless” driving is not sufficient to register as a threat to 
                                                     
265. United States. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citation omitted), superseded by 
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
266. 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized 
in. Lara, 541 U.S. 193. 
267. 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
268. Id. at 566; see text accompanying supra notes 62–72 for a discussion of the post-Montana 
case history regarding the second exception. 
269. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1975). 
270. Id. at 1179. 
271. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 381–83, 850 P.2d 1332, 1336–37 (1993). 
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tribal autonomy.272 However, limiting a tribe’s ability to prevent 
criminal driving undermines the integrity of tribal sovereignty.273 Thus, 
a tribe’s authority to enforce the law is one of the most important rights 
it retains.274 
Furthermore, the second Montana exception simply provides 
guidance as to the outer extent of a tribe’s retention of authority to 
regulate on-reservation conduct of non-Indians.275 Despite being a 
criminal matter, cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of a drunk driver 
implicates interests that can extend beyond artificial borders.276 Eriksen 
III’s encouragement of non-Indian flight for reservation boundaries 
seriously undermines a tribe’s ability to manage its territory.277 Nothing 
prevents a released violator from returning to a reservation. It was 
incorrect for the Eriksen III Court to flatly dismiss the second Montana 
exception. A tribe’s interest in upholding law and order on its 
reservation is not limited to its territorial jurisdiction.278 The ability to 
                                                     
272. 520 U.S. 438, 457–58 (1997); see text accompanying supra notes 69–70 for discussion of 
how Strate narrowed the application of the second Montana exception.  
273. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 381, 383, 850 P.2d at 1336–37. Courts have previously 
granted exceptions to federal Indian law tenets in order to prevent drunk drivers. Compare United 
States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605–06 (1916) (holding that because the federal government lacks 
jurisdiction to prosecute Indian-on-Indian crime, it also lacked jurisdiction where there was no non-
Indian victim, i.e. victimless crimes), with United States v. Thunder Hawk, 127 F.3d 705, 709 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that Quiver should be limited to only domestic relations, and allowing for 
federal prosecution of a drunk driver). 
274. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1976), rev’d, Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), 
as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F.2d at 
1179. 
275. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 391, 850 P.2d at 1341. 
276. See In re Richie, 127 Wash. App. 935, 942–43, 113 P.3d 1045, 1049 (2005) (recognizing 
that a Washington officer can arrest a suspected drunk driver in Idaho); see also City of Wenatchee 
v. Durham, 43 Wash. App. 547, 550, 718 P.2d 819, 821 (1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010), as recognized in Vance v. State, 116 Wash. App. 412, 65 P.3d 668 
(2003).  
277. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 381–83, 386–91, 850 P.2d at 1336–42; see text 
accompanying supra notes 80–86 for discussion of the Schmuck Court’s finding that a tribe must be 
able to enforce its laws or else non-Indians can act with impunity upon a reservation; see infra Part 
V.D.  
278. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The mere fact that the fishing 
may take place off the reservation does not make the regulation of treaty fishing any less an internal 
matter. The locus of the act is not conclusive.”) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 
1965)). At least one federal court has stated that tribes have the inherent power to uphold law and 
safety within their borders through cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of law violators. See United 
States v. Medearis, 236 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981–82 (D.S.D. 2002) (ruling that an arrest by tribal 
officers that occurred outside the Rosebud Sioux reservation was unlawful because the car was 
parked at a convenience store and the driver was not attempting to evade police). 
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prevent crime on the reservation, even if done through off-reservation 
detention, is a right consistent with a tribe’s dependent status. 
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Wheeler analysis, neither Congress 
nor Point Elliott indicates tribal officers do not have the authority to 
continue cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit and detain law violators. Also, 
the ability to uphold internal law is consistent with a tribe’s dependent 
status, implicating vital tribal interests that can extend beyond concepts 
of territorial limits. A court must view any state statute against this 
background. 
B.  RCW 10.92.020 Does Not Inhibit a Tribe’s Authority to Detain a 
Non-Member Violator 
The Washington State Supreme Court must interpret state statutes to 
give effect to the plain meaning of the words and the intent of the 
legislature as either explicitly expressed or as gathered throughout 
related statutes.279 This canon of interpretation directs the Court to find 
that RCW 10.92.020 sought to expand a tribal officer’s authority, not 
reduce it. 
The plain language of the statute mandates the Court to view RCW 
10.92.020 as an effort to improve law enforcement upon reservations by 
increasing a tribal officer’s authority. The statute states, 
“nothing . . . impairs or affects the existing status and sovereignty of 
those sovereign tribal governments.”280 Therefore, by its own terms, the 
statute does not modify a tribal officer’s inherent sovereign authority. 
The act only created an avenue through which tribal officers could 
enforce state law.281 
The legislative intent and stated purpose behind RCW 10.92.020 
supports this interpretation. Representative John McCoy, 38th 
Legislative District,282 drafted and sponsored the bill that became RCW 
10.92.020. According to Representative McCoy, the bill was a reaction 
to inefficient and ineffective law enforcement measures within 
reservations.283 Due to their limited jurisdiction and resources, tribes 
relied on state officers to help enforce the law.284 This often meant tribes 
                                                     
279. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 11–12, 43 P.3d 4, 10 (2002). 
280. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(7) (2010). 
281. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.070(6); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(1), (4)–(5). 
282. The 38th District consists of parts of Snohomish County, including Everett, Marysville, and 
the Tulalip Indian Reservation. Find Your Legislator, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE, 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/DistrictFinder/Default.aspx?district=38 (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).  
283. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7. 
284. Id. 
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were at the mercy of the availability of a local peace officer.285 If a peace 
officer could not come to the site of a detention, tribal officers were 
forced to release law violators.286 Also, local law enforcement agencies 
often assigned only one peace officer to the reservation, further limiting 
the resources available.287 The same law enforcement agencies were 
unwilling to negotiate interlocal agreements with tribal governments and 
refused to extend full faith and credit to tribal officer-initiated 
detentions.288 Gaps in criminal jurisdiction289 compounded the lack of 
law enforcement as violators could hop between jurisdictions, easily 
falling through the gaps.290 RCW 10.92.020 forces local police agencies 
to negotiate with tribes and aims to establish more cohesive crime 
prevention throughout all levels of government.291 The legislative intent 
of the statute was to make it easier for tribal officers to make arrests that 
courts would later uphold, and for the state as a whole to maintain law 
and order.292 
Related statutes also suggest the Washington State Supreme Court 
should only interpret RCW 10.92.020 as an extension of a tribal officer’s 
authority. Washington statutes that address tribal officers evince a goal 
to improve law enforcement while respecting the self-government of 
tribes.293 At a basic level, the legislative creation of the status of “tribal 
officer”294 is an acknowledgment of the position’s legitimacy within the 
state. To receive state recognition as a “tribal officer,” the officer must 
undergo the same training as a peace officer,295 ensuring a minimum 





289. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1418 (“[Public Law 280 created] jurisdictional 
vacuums or gaps . . . . Sometimes these gaps exist because no government has authority. Sometimes 
they arise because the government(s) that may have authority in theory has no institutional support 
or incentive for the exercise of that authority.”). 
290. In particular, instances of Domestic Violence and Drug Trafficking were, and continue to be, 
problematic. For example, in mixed relationships (meaning only one spouse was a member of the 
tribe) if the non-member was the abuser, there were limited circumstances in which the state law 
system would step in, leaving many occurrences unprosecuted. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, 
supra note 7. 
291. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19.003 (2010). 
292. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7. 
293. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020; WASH. 
REV. CODE § 43.101.157 (2010). 
294. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010(2). 
295. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.157(1); see supra note 134 for an outline of the training 
requirements. 
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standard of law enforcement upon reservations. Furthermore, 
Washington’s assertion of jurisdiction over reservations under Public 
Law 280,296 and subsequent efforts at retrocession,297 indicate a 
continued intent to combat lawlessness while supporting tribal interests 
in self-government. Such goals are accomplished by affording tribal 
officers more power, not less. 
Because this is an issue of first impression in Washington, it is helpful 
to examine how another state has interpreted a similar statute. Under 
Nebraska law, a tribal officer can receive certification to arrest for 
violations of state law.298 Similar to Washington,299 the certification only 
authorizes tribal officers to enforce state laws for violations on 
reservation lands.300 The location of the offense was the dispositive issue 
in Young v. Neth,301 one of the few cases nationally that interprets the 
authority of tribal officers in cross-jurisdictional issues. In Young, the 
court invalidated a certified tribal officer’s arrest of a drunk driver who 
violated the law off the tribal officer’s reservation.302 The tribal officer 
acted outside his authority because: (1) the officer was not in fresh 
pursuit following the commission of the charged crime, (2) the crime 
occurred off the reservation, and (3) the tribal officer was the arresting 
officer who conducted the field sobriety tests.303 However, the Nebraska 
State Supreme Court recognized the tribal officer would have been 
within his rights if the officer observed the drunk driving on the 
reservation, engaged in fresh pursuit, and only detained until proper 
authorities arrived.304 The Court stated that this held true even for non-
certified tribal officers.305 Citing the Washington case, State v. Schmuck, 
the Nebraska court reiterated that the “tribe’s proper response to a crime 
committed by a non-Indian on the reservation is for the tribal police to 
detain the offender and deliver him or her to the proper authorities.”306 
                                                     
296. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010). 
297. ESHB 2233, ch. 48 §§ 1–3, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified as WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)).  
298. NEB. REV. STAT § 81-1414(2) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT § 84-106 (2008); 79 NEB. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 10-001 to 10-009 (2005). 
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010. 
300. 79 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 10-008.  
301. 637 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 2002). 
302. Id. at 889–90. 
303. Id. at 886–87, 889. 
304. Id. at 889. 
305. Id. 
306. Id. (quoting State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 387, 850 P.2d 1332, 1339 (1993)).  
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The Young decision instructs an interpretation that the Nebraska statute 
only affects a tribal officer’s ability to arrest for violations of state 
law.307 
The canons of statutory interpretation mandate that the Washington 
State Supreme Court read RCW 10.92.020 only as an extension of the 
authority to enforce state law. Persuasive authority from another 
jurisdiction supports this interpretation. The legislature did not intend to 
limit a tribe’s ability to ensure safety on the reservation through the 
detention of non-Indian violators. 
C.  The Precedent the Eriksen III Majority Cites For the Necessary 
Limits of Territorial Jurisdiction Is Distinguishable 
The Court in Eriksen III stated that the boundaries of territorial 
jurisdiction “necessarily limit” a tribe’s authority to continue fresh 
pursuit off a reservation unless in pursuit of a suspected felon.308 This is 
founded in a general principle that officers can only make valid arrests 
within their jurisdictions.309 The majority cites three cases to support its 
concept of impermeable borders between territorial jurisdictions: State v. 
Barker, City of Wenatchee v. Durham,310 and Irwin v. State.311 However, 
the Powers Act312 superseded two of the three cases (Wenatchee and 
Irwin),313 while Barker did not consider the applicability of the Uniform 
Act.314 Both the Powers Act and the Uniform Act allow for fresh pursuit 
of drunk drivers.315 Therefore, the Eriksen III majority fails to prove its 
contention that territorial boundaries ban an officer’s ability to pursue 
                                                     
307. “[T]he tribal officer’s status as a special deputy state sheriff would authorize the fresh 
pursuit and arrest of persons outside the reservation, whether Indian or non-Indian, in accordance 
with Nebraska law.” Auth. of Tribal Police Officers Cross-Designated as Special Deputy State 
Sheriffs, Neb. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 02009, 2002 WL 470823, at *4 (Mar. 25, 2002). 
308. State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 512, 259 P.3d 1079, 1082 (2011). 
309. Id. at 509, 259 P.3d at 1081 (citations omitted). 
310. 43 Wash. App. 547, 549–50, 718 P.2d 819, 821 (1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010), as recognized in Vance v. State, 116 Wash. App. 412, 65 P.3d 668 
(2003). 
311. 10 Wash. App. 369, 371, 517 P.2d 619, 621 (1974), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.31.100 (2010), as recognized in State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423. 
312. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010). 
313. See State v. Barron, 139 Wash. App. 266, 272 n.2, 160 P.3d 1077, 1079 n.2 (2007); State v. 
Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 921–22, 25 P.3d 423, 426 (2001). 
314. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d at 920 n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 n.1; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.89.010–.080 
(2010). 
315. See supra Parts III.A–.B for discussion on the authorization of pursuit of drunk drivers under 
the Powers Act and the Uniform Act.  
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drunk drivers across jurisdictional boundaries. 
All three cases cited in Eriksen III acknowledge that an exception to 
the limits of territorial jurisdiction is an instance of fresh pursuit.316 As 
indicated in Wenatchee, common law cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit 
required a felony committed within the pursuing officers’ jurisdiction.317 
However, the Powers Act explicitly expanded a Washington officer’s 
authority to pursue persons “reasonably believed to have committed a 
violation of traffic or criminal law.”318 Admittedly, tribal officers do not 
inherently have the power to arrest under Washington law as is required 
for authority under the Powers Act. But banning fresh pursuit because 
the violation was not a felony is no longer the standard.319 
Additionally, the Washington State Legislature has authorized 
officers from other states to continue cross-jurisdictional pursuit into the 
state.320 The Uniform Act permits officers from a foreign jurisdiction, 
whether they receive certification from Washington, to arrest in 
Washington as long as it is pursuant to fresh pursuit.321 Also, the 
Uniform Act specifically authorizes the pursuit of intoxicated or reckless 
drivers.322 Therefore, officers from outside of Washington’s jurisdiction 
may come into the state and arrest for violations of another state’s traffic 
code.323 The Uniform Act means there is no longer a categorical ban of 
fresh pursuit based on certification to enforce Washington law.324 
The combined effect of the Powers Act and the Uniform Act is 
recognized in the only case the Eriksen III majority explores in depth: 
Barker.325 In Barker, the Washington State Supreme Court held that an 
out-of-state officer without special certification from Washington State 
had no common law or statutory authority to pursue a drunk driver 
across state lines based solely upon probable cause for a 
                                                     
316. See Barker, 143 Wash. 2d at 921, 25 P.3d at 425; City of Wenatchee, 43 Wash. App. at 550, 
718 P.2d at 821; Irwin, 10 Wash. App. at 370, 517 P.2d at 620. 
317. 43 Wash. App. at 550, 718 P.2d at 821–22.  
318. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1) (2010). 
319. See id. (expanding the authorized instances of fresh pursuit to non-felonies). The legislature 
abrogated reliance upon the limits of common law fresh pursuit. Vance v. State, 116 Wash. App. 
412, 415–16, 65 P.3d 668, 670 (2003). 
320. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.010 (2010). 
321. See supra Part III.B for discussion of the Uniform Act and its effect on cross-jurisdictional 
fresh pursuit.  
322. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.010. 
323. Id. 
324. Id.; State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 920 n.1, 25 P.3d 423, 425 n.1 (2001). 
325.  Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d 506, 509–10, 259 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2011). 
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misdemeanor.326 The Court did not analyze this issue under the Uniform 
Act because the State did not file an Answer to Barker’s Petition for 
Review.327 This meant the Court was not reviewing the trial court’s 
determination that the officer lacked the legal authority to arrest in 
Washington.328 Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court was only 
evaluating the case under the common law standard of fresh pursuit and 
within the framework of the Powers Act, which required authorization to 
arrest under Washington law.329 In a footnote, the Court made it clear 
that the Uniform Act authorized this arrest.330 Because the Uniform Act 
negates the precedential value of Barker, the Eriksen III majority’s 
reliance on it is misplaced. 
The Eriksen III Court’s misuse of these precedents undermines its 
decision. The Court fails to support its contention that territorial 
boundaries “necessarily” limit jurisdiction. Furthermore, both the 
Powers Act and the Uniform Act expressly allow for fresh pursuit of 
drunk drivers.331 Thus, the Court should not have dismissed the pursuit 
of Loretta Eriksen simply because it was a misdemeanor. The Court’s 
failure to prove this point weakens its decision. 
D.  The Inability of Tribal Officers to Detain Non-Members Without 
Certification Will Endanger General Public Safety 
While the legal foundations of Eriksen III are suspect, the decision is 
also an affront to public policy and safety. As Justice Owens indicated in 
dissent, the majority’s holding illogically restricts a non-certified tribal 
officer’s ability to uphold law and order.332 Non-Indians, in particular 
drunk drivers, are encouraged to engage in a high-speed chase to reach 
the borders of the reservation before tribal officers can impede their 
progress. This not only may result in harm to others on the 
reservation,333 but a high-speed escapee is still driving drunk on the 
                                                     
326. 143 Wash. 2d at 922, 25 P.3d at 426. 
327. Id. at 920 & n.1, 921–22, 25 P.3d at 425 & n.1, 426. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 921–22, 25 P.3d at 425–26; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070 (2010). 
330. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d at 920 n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 n.1. 
331. See supra Parts III.A–.B for discussion on the authorization of pursuit of drunk drivers under 
the Powers Act and the Uniform Act.  
332. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d 506, 520–21, 259 P.3d 1079, 1086 (2011) (Owens, J., dissenting). 
333. The fact that crashes and traffic-related deaths are already disproportionately high among 
Native American populations compounds the negative effects stemming from the encouragement of 
high-speed chases on reservations. In a 2009 agreement with the Tribes of Washington State, the 
Washington Traffic Safety Commission noted that, in the state, Native Americans die in traffic 
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roads of Washington. It is entirely possible that the driver will injure 
citizens of the state.334 Therefore, this is an issue of protecting the safety 
of all Washingtonians. 
The restrictions placed on a non-certified tribal officer are misguided 
and inconsistent with other legislative efforts. The State of Washington 
emphasizes drunk-driving prevention.335 For instance, in 2004, the 
legislature found the rate of drunk driving to be “unacceptable” and 
strengthened the laws surrounding blood alcohol tests.336 To “convey the 
seriousness with which the legislature views this problem[,]”337 a 
driver’s refusal to take a test is admissible as evidence in a criminal trial, 
and is sufficient to warrant the State’s revocation of driving privileges 
for at least one year.338 Additionally, in 2011, the legislature passed 
“Hailey’s Law,” which orders police to impound vehicles of DUI 
suspects for twelve hours.339 After Eriksen III, an uncertified tribal 
officer cannot even force the drunk driver to walk home.340 Nothing 
prevents the driver from continuing down the road or reentering the 
reservation and harming other citizens. Such a result runs counter to the 
                                                     
accidents at a rate roughly 3.17 times higher than the combined average of all other racial groups. 
Between 1999 and 2007, Native Americans suffered 32.95 traffic fatalities per 100,000 people (the 
next highest were Hispanics at 15.31). If the data is restricted to drunk-driver related traffic 
fatalities, Native Americans suffer fatal accidents 4.2 times more frequently (17.78 per 100,000) 
than the average of other races (Hispanics were again second highest at 6.83). The Safety 
Commission acknowledges the numbers could actually be worse because crash data upon 
reservations is underreported. Centennial Accord Agreement, State of Washington (Washington 
Traffic Safety Commission)-the Tribes of Washington State, Mar. 1, 2009, 1–3, available at 
http://www.wtsc.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/03/cen_accord0509.pdf. A 
combination of a high propensity of drunk-driver related fatalities and high-speed pursuits 
stemming from evasion of tribal officers cannot equal good results for tribal safety. 
334. Sovereign immunity insulates tribes from private tort litigation for serving alcohol to a drunk 
driver who subsequently hurts an innocent bystander. Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians 
Ass’n, 141 Wash. App. 221, 223, 169 P.3d 53, 54 (2007). 
335. See, e.g., Legislature Passes DUI Impound Bill Dubbed ‘Hailey’s Law,’ KOMO NEWS (Apr. 
14, 2011, 10:36 a.m.), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/119860664.html; David Ammons, 
Gregoire Wants Traffic Sobriety Checkpoints, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2008, 
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Gregoire-wants-traffic-sobriety-checkpoints-1260954.php; 
Curt Woodward, Gregoire Signs Tougher DUI Law, SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 
2006, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Gregoire-signs-tougher-DUI-law-1198561.php. 
336. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 1; see generally WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2010). 
337. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 1. 
338. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308(2)(a)–(b). 
339. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.55.350–.360 (Supp. 2011). “Hailey’s Law” was a direct result of 
an incident where a cited drunk driver struck Hailey Huntley head-on. In this instance, the police 
officer had forced the drunk driver to walk home, but the driver managed to find her way back to 
her car. Legislature Passes DUI Impound Bill, supra note 335. 
340. 172 Wash. 2d 506, 514–15, 259 P.3d 1079, 1083 (2011). 
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efforts of the legislature to curtail drunk driving and risks exacerbating 
the problem by encouraging drivers to engage in flight for the border. 
Beyond the insult to tribal sovereignty, this decision places all people of 
the state in harm’s way. 
VI.  CONGRESS SHOULD EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZE A TRIBE’S 
AUTHORITY TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS ACROSS 
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES 
Only Congress can define tribal inherent sovereign authority.341 
Unfortunately, after Eriksen III, the State did not file a writ of certiorari 
with the U.S. Supreme Court. Now other states may follow 
Washington’s lead and restrict the authority of tribal officers to enforce 
tribal law and safety. To remedy Eriksen III, and to prevent other states 
from following suit, Congress should step in to define tribal authority 
and prevent states from usurping this traditional federal power. 
Congress has expressly defined tribal sovereignty before. In 1990, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina that the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community could not prosecute a non-member 
Indian.342 Afterward, Congress enacted the “Duro Fix.”343 Congress 
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to redefine a tribe’s “powers of 
self-government . . . [as including] the inherent power of Indian tribes, 
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”344 Such legislation restructured the entire analysis in tribal 
criminal jurisdiction. Congress acted within its “exclusive and plenary” 
authority in Indian law to define tribal sovereignty.345 
Here, Congress should similarly step in to relax restrictions on tribal 
jurisdiction. A parallel addendum to the Indian Civil Rights Act, or even 
enacting separate legislation, will expressly define a tribe’s “powers of 
self-government.” The legislation would recognize the tribe’s right to 
protect its sovereign interest in maintaining law and safety through the 
exercise of its right to detain non-Indians. Additionally, Congress should 
declare that artificial territorial boundaries do not limit a tribe’s interest 
                                                     
341. See supra Part I. 
342. 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized 
in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
343. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). See text accompanying supra notes 51–53 for a discussion 
of the “Duro Fix” and its role in the development of Indian jurisdiction. 
344. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to define the 
restrictions on a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction in Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.  
345. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (upholding Congress’s right to relax restrictions on a tribe’s criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians). 
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in protecting its political integrity, economic security, and health or 
welfare. By couching the authority within the terms of the second 
Montana exception,346 Congress would ensure a nexus to on-reservation 
interests in self-government and internal relations. Congress’s express 
recognition of tribal self-governmental powers could even limit a tribe’s 
exercise of extra-jurisdictional detention to instances of fresh pursuit 
originating on the reservation and stemming from a non-Indian’s 
violation of the tribal legal code. The key is that Congress explicitly 
acknowledges a tribe’s interest in exercising its rights is not limited to a 
reservation. This proposed legislation will prevent states from 
unilaterally defining tribal rights and afford tribal interests proper 
protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s ruling in Eriksen III suffers 
from several fundamental flaws. First, the Court incorrectly analyzed a 
tribe’s inherent sovereign authority in terms of a state statute. The 
legislature’s enactment of RCW 10.92.020 is irrelevant to a court’s 
consideration of a tribe’s authority to enforce laws and protect safety. A 
state cannot unilaterally define tribal powers. A tribe retains those 
powers of sovereignty not expressly removed by statute or treaty, or by 
implication of the tribe’s dependent status. Congress has never removed, 
nor did the tribal parties to Point Elliott relinquish, the authority to 
detain non-Indian law violators. Courts have even held that it is a tribe’s 
affirmative duty to detain violators and deliver the individuals to state 
officers. Where the officer detains a law violator does not change where 
the non-Indian broke the law or the internal tribal interests involved. The 
ability to enforce laws is a vital part of self-government that can extend 
beyond borders. Second, the Court misinterpreted RCW 10.92.020 as a 
limit on tribal authority to enforce laws. The plain meaning of the 
statute, and the legislative intent, indicate an effort to increase law 
enforcement on reservations by allowing tribal officers authority to 
arrest for violations of state law. This interpretation is in line with 
related statutes and a similar jurisdiction. Third, the Court also 
misapplied the precedent it cited as support for the impermeability of 
territorial boundaries. None of the cases the majority cited actually prove 
this contention, nor do they directly apply to the situation at hand. 
Reliance on them as sole support for the proposition that tribes cannot 
                                                     
346. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–66 (1981); see text accompanying supra note 
61. 
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have interests outside their reservation boundaries is misplaced. Finally, 
Eriksen III flouts public safety and legislative efforts to prevent drunk 
driving, encouraging drivers to engage in a high-speed race for the 
reservation border. 
Congress should pass legislation to explicitly recognize a tribe’s 
sovereign authority to protect internal self-government and public safety 
through cross-jurisdictional pursuit of non-Indian law violators. Through 
this legislation, Congress would offer an express statement that resolves 
without question this jurisdictional gap and statutorily overrules Eriksen 
III. 
 
